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Abstract 
 
This paper is an attempt to find out the determinants of the financial 
deepening in a panel of 15 Former Soviet Union countries and Mongolia. The 
explanatory variables are good institutions, human capital and remittances. The 
main results of the model are: (1) Remittances do influence positively financial 
deepening in this set of data when using random effects models; (2) Human 
Capital has a negative impact when using fixed effects; (3) Institutions do not have 
any impact; (3) Russia does not behave differently than other countries in this 
model; (4) Natural endowments of hydrocarbon do not influence the relationships 
between financial deepening and the three explanatory variables in this set of 
countries.     
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I. Introduction 
 
It is widely recognized by now that a sound financial sector is one of the 
bases for the economic growth. It is also known that, at various level of 
development, this relationship functions differently. For the developing countries, 
a strong financial system that continuously expands is much more important for 
the overall economic growth rate than in the developed countries.  
Naturally, the attention of the economists turned than towards 
understanding the financial sector. A great deal of research was done towards 
finding out what influences the financial sector; what determines it to grow, to 
deepen? Using different sets of data, several empirical models were built and a 
number of variables were found to influence financial deepening (e.g. institutions, 
political climate stability, legal origins, education etc.). It is still not clear cut, 
however, which of these estimations are indeed important and influence financial 
development in all countries, in all periods. Therefore, the debate continues and the 
search for empirical evidence is hence reasonable and justified. 
The theory suggests that the role of financial deepening in relation to the 
overall economic development is different for developed and developing countries. 
However, the data from the former soviet union (FSU) region was never used in 
any model that searches for determinants of the financial deepening. More so, this 
is a transition region where all the countries had the same start and a similar past, 
time wise and policy wise, in terms of financial structure. Analysing financial 
development in a region, group of similar countries, makes more sense, argue 
Detragiache et. al. (2005). While they started at the same time, with same pretty 
much resources, the evolution was different and only after 20 years, the differences 
across the region are significant.  
 Although FSU countries lag behind in terms of economic development, 
their financial systems, as an indicator for economic development, grew and 
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deepened in the last twenty years. The trend is not uniform across all the countries, 
some of them being more successful than others.  
The purpose of this paper is to find the driver behind the development of 
the financial sector in this region. In addition to the traditional regressors, it is 
important to test also for institutions, human capital and remittances. In the 
literature, there are already discussions about the strong connection between the 
financial system development and institutions and human capital. Remittances are 
a more novel area of research for this region, a good pool of data being available 
only in the recent years. Remittances become an increasingly popular topic for 
research, being acknowledged that they represent nowadays a significant share of 
GDP in the FSU countries.         
It is broadly recognized that financial system development is an integral 
part of economic development, which is a largely researched topic for the former 
soviet union countries. Finding out the drivers for the financial development in this 
region would add to the rationalization of economic development in this region.    
The rest of the paper is structure as follows: (2) explains the term financial 
system and presents the literature review on the subject; (3) describes the 
economic development in the former soviet union region; (4) introduces the notion 
of remittances and the related literature; (5) discusses the human capital variable 
and the related academic findings; (6) describes the institutions variable and 
explain its‘ importance in the light of this research; (7) explains the methodology,  
the variables, the data and presents the results. The paper ends with a short 
conclusions and policy implications.  
 
II. Determinants of Financial Deepening: Literature Review 
 
Research on the determinants of the financial development started to be 
popular among the economists only in the last twenty years. It was a sequential and 
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a rather slow evolution of the theory. Already in 1969 Goldsmith established the 
relationship between a solid financial sector and the economic growth. However, 
Lynch (1996) and Outreville (1999) argue that the real appeal of the idea and the 
inspiration for further research came only after McKinnon (1973) and Show (1973) 
published their works where they argued about the importance of the financial 
sector for the economic stability.  
Since then, there were few influential works that proved the existence of a 
direct relationship between the financial sector and the economic growth. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and King and Levine (1993) developed models 
where they argued about the existence of this relationship. Latter, Khan and 
Senhadji (2007) brought evidence that proved there was a strong relationship 
between the economic development and the economic development. Outreville 
(1992) argued that there was a relationship between market structure considered a 
proxy of financial deepening and economic growth. There were others that wrote 
on the subject as well; however, there also were some that hesitated about the 
theory. Levine (1997) found that financial structure was unrelated to the economic 
growth in the developed countries. Even earlier Lucas (1990) argued that the 
financial sector does not play the same role in all countries; that is, in developing 
countries the importance of the financial sector for the economic growth is much 
stronger than in the rich countries. This idea is in line with the findings of Haas 
(2001) and Calderón and Liu (2002). Haas argued that financial intermediaries 
play a significant role in determining the economic growth rate in the Central and 
Eastern European countries through increasing marginal production and incentives 
to save. Calderón and Liu (2002), in trying to find the causality between the 
financial deepening and economic growth came to several conclusions, among 
them also that there is a positive relationship between the two variables and that 
this relationship is stronger in the developing countries than in the industrial 
countries. 
Only after it was generally more or less agreed that there is a direct positive 
relationship between financial sector and economic growth, the attention of the 
 
 
4 
 
researchers turned towards finding the causes of different developments of the 
financial sector in different countries. Although relatively numerous papers were 
written on the subject, the evidences are not so unambiguous. Different data 
samples brought different results, but also different econometric techniques 
employed carry their dose of uncertainty. More than that, all the research so far 
established a correlation between the variables rather than a causality effect. Thus, 
Outreville (1999) uses two measures for financial deepening and finds a strong 
correlation with human resources (the average years of schooling of the labour 
force), but a small negative correlation with Romer‘s (1993) index of socio-
political instability (SPI). He finds no relationship with other variables used in the 
model: inflation, real interest rate and monopoly power. Barro (1991) found that 
there was a strong positive relation between economic development as such and 
political stability and human capital (measured as the school enrolment rates) and a 
negative relationship with market distortions.  
Merton (1992) proved that the financial system is shaped by technological 
development, while Bencivenga and Smith (1991) brought evidence about the 
impact of fiscal policies on the financial development. La Porta et. all. (1997) find 
a direct causality between financial development and the legal origin. They 
investigate a set of former colonies with different legal systems, according to the 
origins of the colonizers. They distinguish between four main types of legal origins 
– English, French, German, and Nordic – and find that colonies with Anglo-Saxon 
origins of the legal system have a higher financial deepening and a higher 
economic development level.  
Girma and Shortland (2004) argue that the degree of democracy and 
political stability do contribute to a better financial development. Other 
researchers, such as Aggarwal et al. (2006), Alberola and Salvado (2006), Giuliano 
and Ruiz-Arranz (2006), found remittances having a significant positive impact on 
the financial deepening. Also remittances and good institutions were proved to 
influence financial deepening by Billmeier and Massa (2007), while institutions 
alone are found important by Singh, Kpodar and Ghura (2009) on their set of data.  
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Other variables that proved to influence financial deepening and that are 
variations of the ones mentioned already are stronger creditor rights (Acemoglu et. 
all. (2002), Cottarelli, Dell‘Ariccia, and Vladkova-Hollar, 2003; Dehesa, Druck, 
and Plekhanov, 2007; McDonald and Schumacher, 2007; and Tressel and 
Detragiache, 2008), enforcement of contracts (Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel, 
2005; McDonald and Schumacher, 2007), poor governance (Detragiache, Gupta, 
and Tressel, 2005; McDonald and Schumacher, 2007), efficient exchange of 
information (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2005; McDonald and Schumacher, 
2007).  
  A distinct set of research is dedicated to the influence of inflation on the 
financial deepening. A negative correlation was found by Huybens and Smith 
(1998, 1999), Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001), Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel 
(2005), and Dehesa, Druck, and Pleckhanov (2007). 
   
Measuring Financial Deepening 
It is commonly acceptable in the academia that there is a strong 
relationship between the development of the financial system and the economic 
growth of a country. There are several indicators that different researchers use to 
measure the financial sector. King and Levine (1993), for example, proposes four 
different indicators to measure the financial depth: (1) LLY, the traditional method 
that uses the size of the formal financial intermediary sector relative to economic 
activity; (2) BANK, that is ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit 
money bank domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets; (3) PRIVATE, this 
is the ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to total domestic credit 
(excluding credit to money banks); (4) PRIVY, the ratio of claims on the 
nonfinancial private sector to GDP. The last two measure domestic asset 
distribution. 
However, the simplest and the commonly accepted measure is the ration 
M2/GDP, which measures the degree of monetization of an economy. McKinnon 
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(1973) and Shaw (1973) successfully argued that financial deepening depends on 
real income and real interest rate. Before them, it was believed that low interest 
rates on bank loans and deposits encourage economic growth, an idea hold by 
Keynesian and neoclassical analysts. McKinon and Shaw came to argue the 
opposite. They argued that higher interest rates increased the amount people are 
willing to hold as financial assets by decreasing the holdings of non-financial 
assets such as cash, gold, commodities, and land (Feldman and Gang, 1990). 
Different researchers propose different ways to measure the financial 
sector; therefore, the financial deepening. Boyd et al. (2001) propose a ―refined‖ 
measure of the financial sector by capturing the relationship between the inflation 
rate and the growth of the financial market. However, these data is not available 
for the developing countries.   
Liu and Woo (1994) use the ratio of long-term money or broad money 
(M2) to short-term money (M1). They argue that this ratio is related to the 
financial deepening of a country because savings increase faster than the 
transactions on the account balance. King and Levine (1993) suggest another 
proxy – the difference between broad money (M2) and narrow money (M1). 
Levine (1997) uses the ratio of bank credit to bank credit plus central bank assets. 
However, this measure cannot be accurately compiled for the development 
countries due to different financial systems and lack of data.  
Outreville (1999) and others use M2 over GDP ratio to measure the 
financial deepening in the developing countries. Although, they acknowledge that 
this is not a perfect measure and that this ratio does not capture all the dimensions 
of the financial sector, it is still the closest to the true variable in the developing 
countries. Outreville argues that the M2/GDP ratio is rather measuring the overall 
size of the financial intermediation. It is also strongly correlated, argues the author, 
with the real GDP and the rate of exchange. The broad money M2 can be 
interpreted also as a measure of monetization in inflation prone countries, argues 
Outreville.  
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Haas (2001) in his paper argues that it is logically correct to use the level of 
financial intermediaries when measuring the financial deepening in the developing 
countries. He gives an example of a small business owner and his options for 
borrowing in a developing country. He makes the point that the business owner 
would have to go to for funds to financial intermediaries or to the financial market. 
A comparison between the two is made and Hass finds several raison d’être for 
financial intermediaries and not for the financial markets in these countries. First, 
the intermediaries can benefit from economies of scale, thus reducing their costs in 
the developing countries. Second, financial intermediaries are usually quicker and 
more flexible, an important attribute when working in developing countries. Third, 
there is a large amount of information asymmetries in the developing countries. 
Direct financing, through financial markets, does not solve these asymmetries as 
well as financial intermediaries. Thus, based on all three explanations, the financial 
intermediaries are better suited to be present in the developing countries.   
Monetary and credit aggregates may not be an exact measure for a 
country‘s financial development (Lynch, 1996). However, it is a sufficient 
approximation and, most importantly, it is the most accurate data on financial 
sectors of the developing countries.  The data is provided by the IMF statistics.   
Detragiache et all (205) in their paper make a thorough syntheses of the 
theoretical findings about what determines financial deepening. They present a list 
of papers written on the subject that have contributed to the development of the 
theoretical background about the financial deepening:  
“What do we know so far? A large literature has drawn on 
aggregate and bank-level data to uncover the determinants of 
financial sector development and performance in broad cross-
sections of countries. Institutions (broadly defined) have been 
identified as a key element in financial sector performance. 
Institutions, in turn, have been traced back to differences in legal 
origin (La Porta, and others, 1998), geographical conditions at 
the time of colonization (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 
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2001), and cultural factors (Stulz and Williamson, 2003). Other 
studies have focused on the role of state banks (La Porta and 
others, 2002; Micco, Panizza, and Yañez, 2004), foreign banks 
(Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, Huizinga, 2001), and inflation 
(Boyd, Levine, and Smith, 2001). In addition, regulations 
restricting bank activities have been found to hinder financial 
sector performance, while those encouraging private sector 
monitoring of banks appear to help   (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2004). Recent work has also uncovered that compliance with 
international standards of good regulation and supervision is 
associated with healthier banking systems (Das, Quintyn, and 
Chenard, 2004; Podpiera, 2004), and better creditor protection 
and information access increase credit to the private sector 
(Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer, 2005).” (Detragiache, Gupta 
and Tressel, 2005) 
 
To conclude, there is a considerable amount of literature that is dedicated to 
finding the determinants of the financial deepening. The subject matter is so 
popular among economist because there is another set of writings that proved the 
existence of a direct link between overall economic development or growth and the 
financial deepening. While this last set of studies reviled unbendable theories, the 
discussion about what determines the financial deepening still continues. Here is a 
summary list of potential factors that were found in different set of data to have 
some influence on the quantity of money in an economy: 
 Geographic barriers to transmit financial tools (rural-urban); 
 Legal origin (English, French, German, Nordic); 
 Settlers‘ mortality (colonial past, endowment of natural resources); 
 Ethnic homogeneity; 
 Political stability; 
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 Inflation – negative effect on foreign debt (only for relatively small cases 
of inflation, around 15%); 
 Fiscal position (large deficits); 
 Remittances;  
 Bank ownership (foreign banks versus national banks, bank market 
concentration); 
 Investments climate indicators (how easy is to invest); 
 Financial sector (including banks) regulation and supervision; 
 
As mentioned, there are still many debates among scientists about these causes 
of financial deepening. A firm relationship is not established, yet, by the theory. 
Different samples of data reveal different results. Thus, it is needed that the 
economists bring further empirical evidence. The literature on the subject is 
especially lacking evidence from the eastern Europe and central Asia. 
       
III. Former Soviet Union Economies 
 
After twenty years of transition, it becomes increasingly incorrect to 
analyse the entire former soviet union region as a whole. Although the countries 
have a common communist past with all it takes in terms of economy, it was never 
a homogeneous region. This is even more true after twenty years of discrete 
development, with different endowments, geopolitics and human development.  
In the Development and Transition issue, published by UNDP and LSE, 
that celebrated ―The Twenty Years of Transition and Human Development,‖ 
(2009), the developmental economics professor Giovanni Andrea Cornia points 
out this fact. He distinguishes several episodes in the region of ―tendencies‖ to 
convergence or divergence. Right after the break away of the soviet union, Cornia 
argues, the region differed much more in their policies and economic performance. 
In the mid of 1990s, a convergence towards ―catching up‖ with the west was 
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registered by EBRD (although, I think this is more true for the CEE and Baltic 
countries than the CIS countries and Mongolia). The period after 2000 is 
distinguished as a new episode of registered economic growth, but at the same 
time, a period where the divergences between the different former soviet union 
countries deepened.  
Using the 2006 economic development data, Cornia (2009) states that it is 
possible to distinguish between four clusters of former socialist countries, each 
with different characteristics and radically diverging from the others. Cornia lists 
them as follows: 
1. Countries dependent on the export of manufactured goods, 
supported in most cases by large inflows of foreign direct 
investment and financing by foreign banks, such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Belarus, and 
Ukraine.  
2. Countries with mixed and service oriented economies (the Baltic 
States, Bulgaria, Romania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and Georgia) with an important share of output and 
employment in ‗other services‘ in the Baltics, tourism in Croatia, 
and informal low value-added services in the other countries. 
3. Countries that are commodities exporters (Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan), strongly dependent on world 
commodity prices and demands, and suffering to some extent from 
the ‗Dutch disease‘. 
4. Countries for which an initial dependence on official 
development assistance has given way to a reliance on migrant 
labour, relying in this way for their growth on large and steady 
inflows of remittances (Albania, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).  
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The study finds that real economic growth is registered, although still 
small, only in the first cluster, where manufacturing was developed, all others 
registering downfalls in comparison. As far as the social performance goes, the 
findings show that only the fourth cluster registers improvements. In the others, the 
data analyses show downfalls (Cornia, 2009).    
Mongolian economy is dependable on the export of agricultural products 
and mining industry (CIA, The World Factbook). The foreign investment and aid, 
as well as the remittances are significant for the Mongolian economy, thus the 
country being more similar to cluster three and four. Mongolian economic timeline 
displayed a similar pattern as the rest of the former soviet union republics. In 2000-
2002, Mongolia experienced a deep crises due natural calamities, after which it 
registered a substantial economic growth, about 9% per year, up to the 2008. The 
global financial crises touched on Mongolian economy as well, dropping its 
growth to 4%. However, strong recovery is being expected in the immediate years 
(CIA, The World Factbook).   
Nevertheless, one would think that all these countries still have something 
in common. Haas (2001) finds at least two similarities:  
 All these countries are still quite poor overall. 
 All these countries have experienced fast and radical institutional changes 
that have no historical precedence for the humanity. Thus, the financial 
system was almost non-existing. The closest to it was the banking system, 
which, however, was centralized. Haas argues that these were actually one 
huge monolithic bank with the role of only transferring funds to firms 
across the FSU, according to the requirement of the central planning. 
Lending based on risk or lending based on demand from the commercial 
institutions was non-existing. Savings were done through completely 
different structures/banks, the savings banks.  
 
After the break-away of the soviet republics, there was a two-tire reform 
made in the financial/banking system (Haas, 2001). First, the commercial banks 
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separated from the central banks and started their activities based on the capital 
market principles. Second, these banks were privatized and restructured.  
The process of transiting to a well functioning financial system based on 
capital market rules is still underway in the FSU. Although all of them started at 
the same point, after twenty years of development (or stagnation at times), 
different FSU countries are at different level of development of their financial 
system.  
Haas (2001) argues that one should be careful to some specificities when 
talking or analysing the financial sector in the FSU countries. He inspires his 
research from the Van Ees and Garretsen (1994). They find at least three financial 
distortions worth bearing in mind when talking about the economies in transition: 
1. There are, so called, soft budget constrains (SBC‘s) and no bankruptcy 
laws. SBC‘s are cases when banks and other financial institutions receive 
funding from the government in times of stress. SBC‘s exist, according to 
the exact definition proposed by Mitchell (2000), when: ―A firm has a soft 
budget constraint if (1) it has negative expected net present value but 
receives financing; or (2) if a financial decision of a creditor or the 
government following default allows the firm to continue in operation 
although its assets would yield a greater return in an alternative use.‖ 
During the transition period, these SBC‘s persisted for a long time in the 
FSU countries and called for inefficient allocation of funds at the 
macroeconomic level. 
2. Poor conduct of the privatization process and its aftermath effects. This 
again, led to poor allocation of funds at the macroeconomic level. 
3. The initial conditions of each country that, because of the path-
dependency, influence the actions of the current economic agents.   
 
It is also important to say that financial sector in the FSU countries remains 
up to nowadays rather mixed and complicated. It is still disputed whether in these 
 
 
13 
 
countries is better to have a bank-based system or financial market-based system. 
The analysts are still divided over the two models. 
 
IV. Remittances 
 
Remittances are the money sent by labour emigrants to their country of 
origin. In the literature, many times it includes also the transfers associated with 
moving and other financial items that might arise from this. The IMF definition of 
remittances, also used by Shelburne and Palacin (2007) in their paper, comprises 
three items on the balance of payment of a country. These are 1) workers‘ 
compensation under the income account (income earned by seasonal and short-
term workers), 2) workers‘ remittances under the current account (income earned 
by migrants that stay over a year in a foreign country, and 3) transfers under the 
capital transfers account (capital brought by migrants when returning). The second 
item is by far, according to Shelburne and Palacin (2007), the largest and most 
important in terms of influence items. It counts for more than half of all the 
remittances in one country. The first component is the second by importance and 
the third constituting only a small part of the overall remittances. Workers‘ 
remittances, the second component, is specific, in terms that it is important for the 
overall income of a migrant, but it has a much smaller influence on the 
macroeconomic aspects of the home country
1
. Almost half of the income received 
by the migrants living over a year abroad remains in the foreign country, when 
migrants have to pay for their living (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007). The numbers 
vary from country to country and from one period to the other, but the pattern is 
more or less the same.   
The definition of remittances needs to be improved overall. There are still 
questions about what to consider remittances and what not. For example, argue 
Shelburne and Palacin (2007) that it is not clear whether to consider mortgage 
                                                             
1
 Home country is the country receiving the remittances; foreign country is where remittances originate.  
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loans taken abroad as remittances. If yes, than the purpose of remittances would 
change dramatically – remittances will start creating future obligations.   
The discussion on remittances has been intensifying in the past years, when 
remittances reached to represent the second largest source of external financing, 
after the foreign direct investment (FDI), in the developing countries. In 
comparison to FDI, remittances proved to be more stable flows of capital, not 
being affected by economic downturns and natural disaster. More so, during such 
crises (less during the last), remittances grow (Yang, 2006). The motivation for 
sending the remittances was found to be emotional (Bougha-Hagbe, 2006). 
Comparing to the financial aid, remittances also proved to not affect 
competitiveness (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005).  
In the FSU region, many countries heavily rely on remittances, Tajikistan 
and Moldova being the most affected ones. In this region, there are several sources 
where remittances come from: the EU, the US, but also Russia. More so, the 
Moscow region and the surroundings are known to be a major source for transfers 
to almost all the FSU countries.  
The channels for transferring the money are also an important aspect. Some 
transfers are made through banks and fast transfer operators, or MTOs (e.g. 
Western Union, Money Gram), and trough unofficial channels, such as relatives, 
friends, bus drivers, and train or airline operators, largely based on trust. Of course, 
the general interest of an economy would be to have all remittances transferred 
through banks. Thus personal accounts would be set and savings might increase. 
However people chose the unofficial means because they require less personal 
information disclosure than banks would do. Another explanation is that there are 
not sufficient banking products to suit the needs of the migrants. 
The academic literature on remittances is abundant, especially in the recent 
years. The impact of remittances on different matters, such as poverty, education, 
entrepreneurial activities, and health is well documented. There are several 
researches that proved that remittances reduce the level of poverty (Adams, 2004 
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on Guatemala; Lopez-Cordova, 2005; Taylor, Mora and Adams, 2005 on Mexico). 
More so, it was found that rural areas in this regard, benefit the most (Maimbo and 
Ratcha, 2005). Empirical research proving the positive relation was done by 
Adams and Page (2003) that conduct an analysis of 74 countries, also by IMF in 
2005 that analyses data on 101 countries. 
Remittances were found to improve schooling for children (Cox and Ureta, 
2003, on El Salvador; Yang, 2005, on Philippines; Hanson and Woodruff, 2003, 
and Lopez-Cordova, 2005, on Mexico). Remittances promote entrepreneurship 
(Massey and Parrado, 1998; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001; Maimbo and Ratha, 
2005; Yang, 2005) and reduce infant mortality (Kanaiaupuni and Donato, 1999; 
Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005; Duryea et. al., 2005; Lopez – Cordova, 2005). 
The academic research on the effect of remittances on the economic growth 
is little and inconsistent, however. Chami et. al. (2003) find on a panel data of 113 
countries that remittances negatively associated with the economic growth. 
Solimano (2003), on the contrary, finds a positive association on panel data of 
Andean countries. In 2005, the IMF research showed, at best, lack of correlation at 
the country level. The IMF‘s most recent paper on remittances (2009) and Barajas 
et. al. (2009) state that, undeniable, remittances have poverty-alleviating and 
consumption-smoothing effects on recipient households. But the key empirical 
question is whether they also serve to promote long-run economic growth. At best, 
both of them find no impact on economic growth. 
The effects of remittances on financial deepening are not very well 
exploited. There are numerous descriptive papers on the subject, mainly concerned 
with finding ways to employ remittances as savings and investments. Among the 
first to explore the subject is the paper of Aggarwal et. al. (2006). They find a 
significant positive effect of remittances on the bank deposits and bank credit to 
private sector, as a prototype of financial sector development.    
Another paper that study the effect of remittances, institutions and natural 
resources on the stock market development (as a prototype for financial deepening) 
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is Billmeier and Massa‘s, 2007. They find that remittances and institutions are 
significantly positive impact on market capitalization. Both of them are important.  
Remittances are an important source of poverty alleviation and consumer 
spending in the CIS countries. The phenomenon influences several economies in 
the region very deeply. However, the true numbers and, therefore, the true effects 
are hard to identify due to several reasons: (i) some countries do not report these 
remittances on their balance sheets; (ii) others that do, give no guarantees that their 
figures are absolutely true, given the unlawful specifics of remittances; (iii) often, 
data is poorly gathered and estimated.  
Nevertheless, the WB, IOM, IMF and national governments and central 
banks are employing different strategies to follow the phenomenon and gather the 
best possible data. One of such attempts is done by Robert Shelburne Jose Palacin 
from UNECE in 2007. According to them, there is remittances flow from outside 
the region to countries in the region, but also in between the discussed former 
soviet union countries themselves. Thus, Russia and Kazakhstan are found to be 
the largest remittances outflow sources. At the same time, Russia and Moldova are 
found to be the destination for the largest amount of remittances compared to the 
national GDP.   
According to the data cited by these authors, there were about USD 200 
billion in 2006 (by WB estimates) transferred to the developing and transition 
countries (USD 300 billion in 2007, according to IFAD). The number is huge and 
increased rapidly in the last decade. For the FSU region and Mongolia, in the 
middle of 1990s the remittances constituted an insignificant percentage compared 
to the overall GDP. The foreign direct investment (FDI), the official 
developmental aid (ODA) and the private capital were the major sources of foreign 
capital in the region. Today, the remittances are by far the largest source of foreign 
revenue, being twice as large as ODA, for example. In every country in the region, 
the remittances are also greater than the amount of exports, thus being the major 
source for foreign exchange accumulation. 
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IFAD found that about 13% of the whole number of remittances in the 
world is going to the CIS countries. According to the calculations of IMF data used 
in this paper, the total inflow of remittances in the 16 countries is USD 101131,663 
millions for the period 1992-2008. The outflow is of USD 124745,09 millions.  
 
Figure 1.   Remittances Outflow and Inflow in FSU, 1992-2008 
 
           
Source: IMF, Author’s estimations 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution by country of the inflows and outflows of 
remittances. Russia is by far a source for a large amount of remittances (USD 
95165,75 millions), followed by  Kazakhstan with  USD 18847,59 millions. At the 
same time, Russia is also by far a large beneficiary from remittances. During the 
period of 1992-2008 a total of USD 40412,83 millions were brought in the 
country. Other receivers of large quantities of remittances during this period of 
time were Ukraine with USD 12844 millions, Moldova with USD 7873,86 
millions, and Tajikistan USD 6196,867 millions. Besides Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan all the other FSU countries were net receivers of remittances (see 
Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Net Receivers of Remittances, 1992-2008 
 
Source: IMF, Author’s estimations 
 
The relevant literature, as well as Shelburne and Palacin (2007) in their 
research argue that there are benefits coming from such a large amounts of 
remittances, but also there are negative effects. The line between the two is not 
definite, yet, empirical findings oscillating between pros and cons. Thus, it is 
proven that large amounts of remittances help at reducing poverty at least in the 
short run. The education and health services for the recipients are increasing, the 
remmittants also benefit from improved job skills. Because most of the emigrants 
are usually the highest skilled from the country, after they emigrate, there are more 
jobs left at home for the poor and less skilled people. However, this fact brings its 
negative effects as well. It can be argued that there is a brain drain occurrence, as 
well as incentives for the recipients at home not to work for low paid jobs. More 
so, the poverty alleviation effect, therefore economic growth at home, depends 
very much on the complementary domestic economy, argue Shelburne and Palacin 
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(2007). If the remittances are channelled well at home, their effect can be 
sustainable on the long run. Also, the composition of the emigrants (skills, 
education etc.) is important for how the remittances are used at home, therefore, 
used for poverty alleviation.  
Shelburne and Palacin (2007) conclude that while the impact of remittances 
has positive effects at the micro-household level, not the same can be said about 
the macroeconomic level. In large, remittances increase at home the housing 
market, the construction industry develops rigorously and there is price movement 
is registered. However, all the macroeconomic aspects are not yet well studied and 
understood.  
 
V. Human Capital 
 
From the developmental economics, strong arguments come in favour of a 
positive relationship between human capital and economic growth, the direct 
relationship, however, between human capital and financial deepening not being 
explored too much. 
Outreville (1999) is among the first to do it. He performs a cross-sectional 
analysis of 57 developing countries and finds out that human capital and socio-
political stability are important factors in explaining the level of financial 
development. Earlier Nelson and Phelps (1966) showed that educational level 
along with the capital-labour ratio influence the economic development of a 
country and explain international trade patterns. However, the theories were not 
proved empirically.   
Human capital is a broad and somehow difficult notion to measure. 
Nevertheless, the literature proposes several ways to express human capital. The 
most used index in the literature, a much complex one is the Human Development 
Index (HDI), estimated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
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and published since 1990. It encompasses life expectancy, literacy rate, and access 
to resources sufficient for a decent standard of living. Human development is 
understood in this respect as ―enlarging People‘s choice.‖ 
There are other proxies in the academia to measuring human capital. Thus, 
Mankiw et al. (1992) uses the average years of schooling of the labour force. 
Baldwin (1971) uses the percentage of educated people, having third-degree 
education, in the labour force. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) propose to use a 
measure based on the capacity of a nation to adopt, implement and innovate new 
technological developments.  
Human capital is usually understood in its broad sense. It is understood as 
all people having a decent life. The key components to it are understood as being 
an easy education access and good health system. People with higher education 
have access to more information and can make use of this information. Educated 
people are also risk averse and save more. Health services contribute again to the 
development without interruption. With a good health system, the endowment 
from generation to generation grows. Many argue, however, that human 
development is enlarging peoples‘ choices (Outreville, 1999). People themselves 
know what they need to improve their live in order to reach a decent standard of 
leaving. Their acts are determined by the limited opportunities that the 
environment in which they live offers them. The human development 
discrepancies between the different countries appear because each country offers a 
different set of choices, large or smaller, to its citizens.  
In the former soviet union countries, the discrepancies of human 
development before the 1990s was much smaller than it is now. Although, there 
was a deep divide between countryside and cities, everybody had access to free 
education and health services. The level of proficiency was different in more 
remote regions as oppose to the city centres or important industrial zones. If 
comparing the FSU countries among themselves before 1990s, another 
discrepancy was registered between European Russia, mostly Moscow, Leningrad 
etc., and the rest of the other soviet republics.      
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Almost twenty years after the revolution in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
human development measure, as expressed by the UNDP‘s Human Development 
Index, is very mixed. The components of the HDI are different themselves across 
FSU region. For example, while the education system improved in the oil reach 
countries, access to education did not. The same picture is offered for the health 
system. In the export commodities countries, both access and quality stagnated 
somehow or improved insignificantly. The only group that registered some visible 
improvement seems to be the countries dependant of the migrant labour and of 
course the Baltic States. Both, health and education system rose in these countries. 
Figure 3 shows the averages of human capital for each country in the 
sample. Armenia has overall the highest human capital in the region, 0,784 base 
points. It is followed by Estonia, Georgia and Lithuania, all three scoring 0,773 
base points. Latvia is a step lower with 0,762 points, the lowest scoring being 
Turkmenistan with 0,652 points.  
  
Figure 3.  Average Human Capital, 1992-2008 
 
Source: UNDP, Author’s estimations 
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VI. Institutions 
 
Considering institutions when talking about financial development and, 
implicitly, economic development, it is increasingly acceptable and recommended 
nowadays. There is a whole branch of economics, the institutional economics, that 
tries to analyse the effects of institutions in economy from all points of view. 
However, two principles are emphasised by the institutional economics: the 
enforcement of the property rights and the role of transaction costs (Haas, 2001). 
Institutional economics, according to Haas, assumes that people live according to 
their mental models about the society. These models differ from one group of 
people to another and are influenced partly by culture, partly by experiences, and 
partly by learning.  
Institutions may be understood as rules of a game. They should not be 
confused with the organizations, which is a narrow way. The notion of institutions 
might be understood in a broader way, as the system of rules, customs and 
believes, and the trust people have in their written or unwritten laws. Or, it can be 
understood as the organizational institutions: political, economic, social, 
educational etc.   
Haas (2001) describes institutions as made of three parts: formal rules 
(which are laws and regulations), informal constraints (made of conventions and 
self-imposed codes of conduct), and the specificities that appear when 
implementing the two. Once institutions appear, they will change very slowly. 
Although, the organizational institutions might change radically and fast, as it 
happened in the FSU, the broad notion of institutions will change slower, 
depending rather on the culture. Institutions are also ―path dependent‖, according 
to Haas. They depend on the historical believes transmitted from generation to 
generation, but also actions done by predecessors will reflect into the present.  
The legal view on the economy may be interpreted as the application of the 
institutional economic. Many research works have proven that the system of law 
influences the economic growth through the financial development system. 
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Investments will take place, businesses will arise only when the investors will be 
confident that they have the full protection against misdoings of the ―insiders‖, 
which are the managers, or are sure that they can retrieve their return to investors 
and when they are assured that at the macroeconomic level big and radical changes 
will not happened unexpectedly.  In short, legal economics sais that financial 
deepening is a better explanatory for financial growth when controlling for 
existence of institutions and their quality. 
One might expect that the difference in institutions that developed in the 
FSU countries after the 1989 might affect the financial sectors. Some countries 
joined the EU, thus completely changing their institutions, following the EU rules; 
others adjusted their system of institutions or developed them from anew following 
different paths. 
The existing literature is consistent with the idea that institutions do matter 
for the overall economic growth of a country. Lejour et.al. (2006) argues that EU 
integration brings institutional change and, therefore, contributes to the economic 
growth. Earlier, North (1990) proves that institutions reduce uncertainty, therefore, 
lowers transaction costs and contribute to economic growth. More so, Rodrik and 
Subraamanian (2003) claim that institutions are the unique factor explaining the 
economic growth. De Groot et. al. (2004) find strong relations between 
institutional quality and trade flows. More so, they say that the differences in 
institutions may impede trade among countries.  
There is also research done on the effect of institutions on the financial 
depth directly. Billmeier and Massa (2007) prove that institutions have a 
significant positive effect on stock market development (used as proxy for 
financial deepening) in a subset of Arab and Central Asian countries.   
Acemoglu et. all. (2002), Cottarelli, Dell‘ Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar 
(2003), Dehesa, Druck, and Plekhanov (2007), McDonald and Schumacher (2007), 
and Tressel and Detragiache (2008), all find that stronger creditor rights promote 
financial development.  
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La Porta et al. (1998) proves that the legal origin (English, French, German 
or Nordic) is important in determining the creditor rights and private credit. 
Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2005), as well as McDonald and Schumacher 
(2007) find that the degree of enforcement of rules and rights has an impact on the 
overall growth of the economy.  
Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2005), and McDonald and Schumacher 
(2007) stress quality of governance as a measure of institutions. They find that 
poor governance increases the coast of doing business. Djankov, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer (2005), as well as McDonald and Schumacher (2007) argue in their works 
that information exchange is important and it should be a proxy for measuring the 
quality of institutions. Good information exchange reduces the cost o screening 
borrowers, while the availability of credit information reduces costs.  
Another way to measure the institution development is Romer‘s index of 
socio-political instability (1993). He measures political instability following Barro 
(1991) that is the mean number of revolutions and coups per year. 
Another conventional proxy for institutions is the Heritage Foundation‘s 
Index of Economic Freedom. The index is used by many relevant papers (Lejour 
et. al., 2006; et. al., 2004) and in this paper. The index is composed of 10 factors 
with equal weights: trade policy, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary 
policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, property rights, 
wages and prices, regulation, black market. 
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Figure   4.  The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, 2001-2010 
 
 
Source: The Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation, Author’s estimations 
 
In the FSU region, the index varies considerably from country to country. 
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the index across the region during the period 
2001-2010 for which the data is complete for all countries. The highest overall 
index belongs to Lithuania, followed by Armenia and Latvia. The lowest scoring 
countries are Belarus and Turkmenistan. 
 
VII. What Drives Financial Deepening in the FSU Countries? 
 
A. Variables and Assumptions 
 
Financial Deepening is a measure of the quantity of broad money in an 
economy as a percentage of the GDP.  A special formula is proposed by Calderόn 
and Liu (2002): 
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M2
GDP
 = 
1
2 
×  
M 2t
CPI t
 + 
M 2t−1
CPI t−1
 
GDP t
  , where 
 
M2 is the Broad Money Liabilities (line 35L) from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) assembled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It 
is the sum of the Currency Outside Depository Corporations (line 34a) and the 
lines 14d, 15, 16a, 24, 25, and 26a (IMF, 2010). It represents the percentage 
change over the last year and ―when there is more than one version or definition of 
broad money (money plus quasi money for non-SRF countries) and monetary base 
(reserve money for non-SRF countries) over time, different time series are chained 
through a ratio splicing technique. When actual stock data needed for the growth 
rate calculation are missing, no percent change is shown in the world table.‖ (IFS, 
2010) 
CPI is Consumer Price Index (line 64..XZF…) from IFS and it shows the 
percentage change over the last period. It is commonly used as an indicator of 
inflation and it ―reflect changes in the cost of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and 
services by the average consumer‖ (IFS, 2010).  The Laspeyres formula is used 
and the data is taken from household expenditure surveys conducted by the 
national governments.  
GDP is real, taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) where 
it is measured in national currency. For the purpose of this model, the GDP is 
transformed in U.S. Dollars. The exchange rate is the rf series from the IFS and it 
indicates the average rate for the period.  
This formula, argue Calderόn and Liu (2002), is a better measure of the 
financial deepening than others used in the literature because it solves for two 
problems: the stock-flow problem and the inflation problem. The items 
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representing the financial intermediaries are measured at the end of each period, 
but the real GDP is computed over the year. Calderόn and Liu (2002) and, earlier, 
King and Levine (1993a) have solved for this problem by taking the average over 
two consecutive periods and dividing it by the GDP of the last one.  
The excessive inflation impact on the financial deepening is solved by 
deflating the Broad Money at the end of each period by the CPI at the end of each 
period. This technique was proposed by Levine et. all. (2000) and later used by 
Calderόn and Liu (2002) and others. 
There are other measures of the financial deepening used in the literature, 
such as the ration of the credit provided by the financial intermediaries to the 
private sector over GDP (Calderόn and Liu, 2002) or the stock market 
development (Billmeier and Massa, 2007). However, for this sample of countries, 
the data is limited. The most accurately calculated variable remains the one that is 
used in this model.    
Remittances are the ratio of the net sum of three accounts from the IMF‘s 
Balance of Payments (BOP) statistics and the GDP. Shelburne and Palacin (2007) 
argue that the common and the most appropriate way to count for all the 
remittances in a country is to add three BOP accounts:  
 Transfers from migrants, residents abroad for over a year. These are 
repatriation of financial assets when migrants return home (net of BOP 
code 2431 credit and 3431 debit);  
 Compensation of seasonal or short-term workers (net of BOP code 2310 
credit and 3310 debit); 
 Remittances of migrants, residents abroad for over a year (net of BOP 2391 
credit and 3391 debit). 
In the context of this model, the net remittances thus calculated are expressed 
as a share of GDP. Aggarwal et all. (2006) in their model use remittances and the 
financial deepening variables in the same, as a share of GDP, and they find no 
correlation of residuals of the two variables.   Because the GDP data is given in 
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billions of national currency, the necessary transformations are made. Also, this 
variable is logged because the variations of it are big (see figures bellow) and it 
will return an extremely large constant.   
 
Figure 5.   Distribution of Remittances 
PLAIN DATA     
 
 
LOGGED DATA 
Source: Author’s estimations 
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The difference the logged remittances variable brings can be seen in the 
models bellow. The models are identical with the exception that in the first one the 
logged variable is used. The constant coefficient changes only.  
 
 Table 1.  Distribution of Remittances 
 
 
 
Model 1:Random-effects 
(GLS) 
Model 7:Random-effects 
(GLS) 
HC 
0.45989 
(-0.7417) 
 
0.60372 
 (-0.5201) 
Institutions 
0.80463 
(-0.2480) 
0.42557 
(0.7989) 
 
Remittances 
 0.07429* 
(1.7972) 
 
Log Remittances 
0.05104* 
(1.9733) 
 
Source: Author’s estimations 
Note: The coefficients with the t-ratio in parenthesis are presented. 
 
Human Capital is a prototype of the Human Development Index (HDI) 
calculated by the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP). While some 
scientists argue that the HDI is an appropriate tool in measuring human capital, the 
index would cause endogeneity problems if used in this model. The HDI is a 
composite of three variables, life expectancy index, education index and income 
expressed as GDP (HDR Technical Note 1). A loop of causality would have been 
caused between the explanatory variable and the dependent variable which is 
M2/GDP.  
In the literature, however, both education and life expectancy are used to 
measure the human capital; therefore, it is considered appropriate to use only the 
two components of the HDI in this model, that is, life expectancy (LEI) and 
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education indexes (EI). The new HC index is the average of the two dimensions 
used to calculate the HDI. The diagram below illustrates in details the process of 
calculating these two indexes. 
The UNDP‘s Human Development Report Office (HDRO) provides the 
data for the last two consecutive years (2006 and 2007). For the previous ones, the 
data and the HDI index are given as averages of 5 years (e.g. 1991-1995, 1996-
2000 etc). It is argued that the HDRO is not a statistical gathering office; they 
rather use the data from other UN agencies, such as IMF, WB and UNCTAD that 
keep and publicize their complete databases. The EI and LEI are very complicated 
and time-consuming to be computed; therefore, the EI and LEI in this paper have 
same average value for five consecutive years for the period 1992-2005. This 
modus operandi does not allow to accurately seize the time-effect of the human 
capital variable on financial deepening; however, it is still accurate enough to 
predict the overall relationship between the explanatory and explained variables.  
 
Figure 6.   Human Capital: two components 
   
   Source: Human Development Report 2007/2008, Technical Note 1 
 
The zeroes indicate that there is not data available. In this case the formula 
calculates the HC based on one variable only. For the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 
the data is extrapolated. The average growth rate for the entire period is found and 
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it is added to the value of 2007. The resulting value is used for all the last three 
years in order to be consistent with the technique used for this variable.  The figure 
bellow shows the smooth and consistent growth path of this value across the years. 
Because the extrapolation is done for a short time period, there are no reasons to 
suspect major deviations in the results.  
 
Figure 7.   LE and EI for Armenia and Tajikistan 
Source: UNDP, Author’s calculations 
  
Institutions variable is The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage 
Foundation‘s Index of Economic Freedom. The index is the average of ten 
components of economic freedom: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal 
freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial 
freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. Each of the 
ten variables are grade on a scale from 0 to 100, the highest having 100 points. The 
overall economic freedom index if then calculated as the average of the ten 
―freedoms.‖    
Hydrocarbon net exporters dummy is used for the four net exporting 
countries in the FSU group. It is believed that natural resource endowments do 
have an important impact on the quantity of money. This dummy is used to verify 
LE Taj EI Taj LE Arm EI Arm
 
 
32 
 
once again this hypothesis. The FSU hydrocarbon net exporting countries are listed 
in the table below. 
 
Table 2.     Hydrocarbon Net Exporting FSU Countries 
Rank Country Thousand barrels per day 
1 Russia 6874 
2 Kazakhstan 1185 
3 Azerbaijan 754 
4 Turkmenistan 86 
   Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration: Country Energy Profile, 2008 
 
Other variables are used in the literature to explain the financial 
deepening; however, their importance is still disputed. Therefore, they are not 
included in this model. For general information, here is a short list: 
Income has been found by Billmeier and Massa (2007) to be linked to the quality 
of institutions and the business cycle mechanics, thus influencing the stock market 
capitalization and, therefore, the quantity of money.  
Inflation change is usually used as a macroeconomic stability indicator and it is 
commonly believed that it influences the financial intermediation sector. However, 
we control for it when computing the M2/GDP formula. 
Domestic credit indicates the level of financial intermediary development by 
evaluating the long-term credits provided by the banks.  
One more reason for why this model do not uses other explanatory 
variables and it is kept as simple as possible is that the sample of observations is 
quite small and more variables would reduce the degrees of freedom in the model. 
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B. The Data 
 
M2: The earliest data on Broad Money that IMF provides is only for two 
countries, Moldova and Estonia, starting in 1992. Starting with 1995 onwards, 
there is data for almost all of the countries. For Tajikistan the records start in the 
year 1999 and for Mongolia in 2002. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not provide 
this type of data, due to the differences in the definition and the measure of this 
variable. No data is published for 2010, yet. 
CPI: The records are slightly better for this variable; starting with 1994 
almost all of the countries in the sample having the data, except the Kyrgyz 
Republic for which it starts in 1995. For Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan no such 
index is computed. No data is published for 2010, yet. 
GDP: IMF started computing this variable for the FSU countries only in 
1992. For Estonia, the GDP is published starting with 1993, and for Georgia 
starting with 1994. The figures for 2010 are predicted.  
Exchange Rates: The data exists for almost the entire period for all the 
FSU countries. There are few gaps and for Turkmenistan the average exchange 
rate per annum is calculated only up to 2002. However, these gaps do not reduce 
the quantity of the data of the other variables.    
Remittances: IMF improved considerably their method of calculating 
remittances with high precision and it reports them diligently across the period for 
all the FSU countries. The data for the last two years, 2009 and 2010 is missing, 
however, for almost all countries. Also, at the beginning of the ‗90s some data is 
missing mostly because there were no such transfers registered, yet, in the FSU 
region. 
Institutions:   The index was put together in 1995. Thus, most of the FSU 
countries have it calculated since 1995-1996. The FSU Asian countries have it 
calculated since 1998: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan. 
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C. Methodology 
 
The analysis uses a panel data from 15 former soviet union countries and 
Mongolia for the period 1993-2008. The following regression is run:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + ℇ𝑖𝑡  
 (1) 
where the dependent variable is the financial deepening, calculated as the ratio of 
broad money (M2), adjusted for inflation, and GDP. This method of measuring 
financial deepening is consistent with the literature and the most accurate for the 
sample of former soviet union countries. The explanatory variables are 
remittances, human capital and institutions. The error term is decomposed in a 
constant (𝛼𝑖) and the residual.  
 The models verify whether the remittances, human capital and institutions 
do have an effect on the financial deepening. The null hypothesis states that the 
coefficients of these three variables are zeros. In other words, there is no 
correlation between the three independent variables and the dependent. The 
alternative hypothesis confirms the existence of a relationship between the 
financial deepening and the three variables. 
In order to decide whether a fixed effect or a random effect model should 
be used, a Hausman test is usually conducted on the data to prove or reject the 
hypotheses that the individual effects are uncorrelated to other regressors. The 
gretl programme automatically performs the fixed effect panel model; therefore, 
when performing the random effect model, the programme automatically publishes 
the Hausman test
2
. Both models are presented below, the fixed effect and the 
random effect with the Hausman test included.  
                                                             
2 Gretl User‘s Guide, 2009: ―When you estimate using random eﬀects, the Breusch–Pagan and Hausman tests 
are presented automatically […]The Hausman test probes the consistency of the GLS estimates. The null 
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Table 3.    Fixed-effects model 
 
Dependent variable: M2_GDP 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
 
 coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value 
Const 9.05521 3.37691 2.6815 0.00863*** 
 
L_Rem 0.235375 0.197017 1.1947 0.23515 
 
HC -8.02078 3.86659 -2.0744 0.04072** 
 
Inst 0.00659708 0.0321365 0.2053 0.83779 
 
Mean dependent var  1.697652 
Sum squared resid  1229.763 
R-squared  0.361358 
Source: Author’s estimations 
Note: The coefficients with the t-ratio in parenthesis are presented. 
 
The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the group-specific error is 
not so correlated and, therefore, the random effects model is preferable. A low p-
value for this test counts against the random effects model and in favor of fixed 
effects.  
𝐻0: 𝐸(𝛼𝑖/𝜒𝑖𝑡) =  0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝐸(𝛼𝑖/𝜒𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 
In this model, the test returns a relatively high p-value (0.291848) and the 
Chi-square (3.7324) with three degrees of freedom is much lower than the critical 
                                                                                                                                                                        
hypothesis is that these estimates are consistent — that is, that the requirement of orthogonality of the vi and 
the Xi is satisﬁed. The test is based on a measure, H, of the ―distance‖ between the ﬁxed-eﬀects and random-
eﬀects estimates, constructed such that under the null it follows theχ2 distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of time-varying regressors in the matrix. If the value of H is ―large‖ this suggests that the 
random eﬀects estimator is not consistent and the ﬁxed-eﬀects model is preferable.‖ 
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value (7.81473). Thus, the null hypothesis is not rejected and the random effect 
model is preferred for this pool of data.  
 
Table 4.   Random-effects (GLS) model and Hausman 
 
Dependent variable: M2_GDP 
 
 Coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value 
Const 9.79948 7.60777 1.2881 0.20049 
 
L_Rem 0.489364 0.247992 1.9733 0.05104* 
 
HC -5.68507 7.66486 -0.7417 0.45989 
 
Inst -0.0167042 0.0673618 -0.2480 0.80463 
 
Hausman test 
 
                                            Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent 
                                            Chi-square(3) = 3.7324 
                                             p-value = 0.291848 
 
Source: Author’s estimations 
Note: The coefficients with the t-ratio in parenthesis are presented. 
 
While many econometricians do rely on the Hausman test in deciding which 
model is better suited for a set of data, other advice to take in consideration 
different factors about the data (see Mátyás and Sevestre, 1996; Hsiao, 1986; 
Mundlak, 1978). The way the data is built is important when deciding which 
model is be more appropriate. Thus, Mátyás and Severstre (1996) list in their book 
several characteristics of the sample that should be checked:  
 The underlying causes. If it is suspected that the individual effect (𝛼𝑖) 
depends on many unobservable variables randomly chosen, than the random 
effect model is recommended to be used.  
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 The nature of the sample. When the sample is small and it is believed 
that the sample units have something in common, the fixed effect 
method is preferable. This is the case of the present model.   
 The type of inference. Both methods can be used, but attention should 
be paid to the interpretation. When using the random effect model, we 
check whether there is an individual effect that varies for each country. 
Within a fixed effect model we want to show that there exists some 
effect that is constant for all countries.  
 Number of variables. The random effect model can be used only when 
the number of cross-section units is much larger than the number of 
parameters that need to be estimated.  
Using one or another model is a tradeoff between efficiency and 
consistency. When performing the random effect model, more information 
between the units of the data is preserved than in the random effect model. The 
estimates are efficient and consistent. However, there is not anymore consistency 
when the unit specific component is correlated with the repressors. 
In this model, the Hausman test indicates to use the random effect 
approach, but the sample is quite small and closed and it is suspected that the unit 
specific effect is constant. Therefore, both models will be performed and the 
results adequately interpreted and compared.  
     Another test that needs to be done is the ―poolability test‖ or the ―Chow 
test‖ which verifies the stability of the repressors across all 16 countries or across 
19 time periods. The idea behind it is that the sample is divided into two groups 
and it is verified whether the coefficients for one group are equal to the coefficients 
of the other. In other words, the behavior of coefficients is tested. If it is the same, 
the data can be ―pooled‖, that is, one equation can be used for all countries across 
all periods.     
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝛽𝑖 ≠ 𝛽 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖  
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In gretl, the Chow test needs to be performed after the pooled OLS model. The 
results are shown in the table below.  The p-value is quite large and the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. Thus, the sample is ―poolable‖ and the error-component models can be 
performed on the data.  
 
Table 5.   Poolability of the data 
 
 
Pooled OLS 
Dependent variable: M2_GDP 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
 
 Coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value 
Const 14.5984 6.29836 2.3178 0.02236** 
 
L_Rem 0.685123 0.20115 3.4060 0.00093*** 
 
HC -9.75961 6.52446 -1.4958 0.13764 
 
Inst -0.0319135 0.0256481 -1.2443 0.21611 
 
Chow test  
for structural difference with respect to du_8 – 
 
 Null hypothesis: no structural difference 
 Test statistic: F(4, 103) = 0.141282 
 p-value = P(F(4, 103) > 0.141282) = 0.966443 
 
Source: Author’s estimations 
Note: The coefficients with the t-ratio in parenthesis are presented. 
 
 Because the sample is small and because the data for the human 
capital variable is averaged, all other different tests will not tell much. However, 
few other manipulations with the model are performed. First, Russia is removed 
from the sample and than a dummy is introduced for the hydrocarbon net exporting 
countries.    
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The outlier Russia: Inheritor of the legacy of the former Soviet Union and 
the largest country in the FSU group, Russian economy might be radically 
different from the others in the sample.  This suspicion is even more valid when 
taking in consideration the vast migration to the Moscow region from the other 
FSU countries and the large amounts of remittances sent from the Moscow regions 
to the other countries. Therefore, we want to control for Russia and see how much 
it influences, if at all, the overall results of the model. Let R be the dummy for 
Russia, then:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + (𝛽1 + 𝛾1𝑅)𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 + 𝛾2𝑅 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡   (2) 
+(𝛽3 + 𝛾3𝑅)𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + αi + ℇit 
 
The null hypothesis states that Russia does not influence significantly the 
financial deepening, whereas the alternative hypothesis states that is considerably 
influencing the results, and therefore an outlier. In other words, we want to check 
whether the impact of remittances, human capital and institutions on the financial 
deepening in Russia is the same as in the entire sample.    
𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2  = 𝛾3 = 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝛾1 ≠ 𝛾2  ≠ 𝛾3 ≠ 0 
The results of the models, fixed effect and random effect, are presented in 
the table below. The null hypothesis can be rejected in the fixed effect model for 
remittances and institutions, but not for the human capital. The dummy for Russia 
shows perfect colliniarity and, therefore, it is omitted. In the random effect model, 
the null hypothesis is rejected only for remittances. In all these cases, the results 
are showing that there is a relationship (the coefficients are not zero) between the 
independent variables and the quantity of money in an economy. More so, the 
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results are comparable with the results of the full sample. It can be concluded that 
Russia is not much more different from the other countries in the sample.  
 
Table 6.    RE and FE on the sample without Russia 
 FE: no Russia  RE: no Russia 
L_Rem 
0,23515 
(1,1947) 
 
0.06647* 
(1.8544) 
HC 
0,04072** 
(-2,0744) 
0.11537 
(-1.5876) 
 
Inst 
0,83779 
(0,2053) 
0.90408 
(0.1208) 
 
Russia dummy 
n.a. 0.16419 
(-1.4008) 
 
Source: Author’s estimations 
Note: The coefficients with the t-ratio in parenthesis are presented. 
 
 Hydrocarbon net exporters: In the FSU group of countries, the largest and 
most important endowment of natural resources is the petroleum. The countries in 
our sample owning petroleum and exporting hydrocarbon products are four. 
Suppose that the group of hydrocarbon net exporters is H; than the equation of the 
model looks like:   
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + (𝛽1 + 𝛾1𝐻)𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 + 𝛾2𝐻 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + (𝛽3 + 
                            𝛾3𝐻)𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + ℇ𝑖𝑡                                  
(3) 
 
The null hypotheses states that being a hydrocarbon net exporting country 
does not affect the overall impact of the three variables on the financial deepening, 
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whereas the alternative hypothesis states that it does make a difference. In other 
words, we verify if the natural resource endowments do have an impact on the 
quantity of money in an economy.   
H0: γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 0 
HA : γ1 ≠ γ2  ≠ γ3 ≠ 0 
The results are presented in the table below for the fixed effect and random 
effect models. 
 
Table 7.    RE and FE controlling for oil net exporters 
 FE: oil  RE: oil 
L_Rem 
0.23515 
(1.1947) 
 
0.07645* 
(1.7893) 
HC 
0.04072** 
(-2.0744) 
0.12888 
(-1.5306) 
Inst 
0.83779 
(0.2053) 
 
0.92457 
(0.0949) 
Oil dummy 1 
 
n.a. 0.17286 
(-1.3724) 
 
Oil dummy 2 
n.a. 0.57390 
(-0.5641) 
Source: Author’s estimations 
 Note: The coefficients with the t-ratio in parenthesis are presented. 
 
The dummy variable in the fixed effect approach exhibits perfect 
collinearity; therefore, the results are biased and cannot be interpreted. The random 
effect model, however, is alright and it indicates that when controlling for 
hydrocarbon net exporting economies, remittances remain as important as before. 
But the dummy for oil exporting countries is statistically insignificant, although it 
influences negatively the financial deepening in an economy. The t-ratio for this 
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dummy is negative and large which indicates that the sample for this variable is 
too small and the extremes are too large. The dummy for two other net exporters 
(Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) are not included because of insufficient data. 
 
D. Panel Regression Results 
 
The table bellow summarizes the result for all the models. There is a 
difference in results when considering the fixed effect or the random effects 
models; however, usually not very large. The most noticeable discrepancy is for 
the remittances variable which proves to be significantly influencing the financial 
deepening in the FSU economies when running a random model and not at all 
when performing the fixed effect model. It may be concluded that there is 
dependence between remittances and the quantity of money in a specific form for 
each country considered separately. The assertion is in line with the fact that in 
some FSU economies remittances are very large, surpassing several times the 
national budgets.  
     Human Capital also exhibits different levels of significance for each 
type of model. It becomes statistically significant in the fixed effect models and 
reveals a negative effect on the financial deepening in the sample. While from the 
technical point of view it can be stated that there is some negative effect that is 
constant across all countries for the entire period, a more reasonable explanation 
would be that the sample is too small for this variable and the extremes are too 
large. The high negative t-ratio confirms it.       
 In the models (3) and (4) Russia is taken as an outlier. The results in terms 
of statistical significance are not very different from the results in the models (1) 
and (2). All three variables display a similar pattern, except the institution variable, 
which is not significant, however. The results can be interpreted as showing that 
Russia is not so much different than the other countries in the sample, as one 
would suspect. At least, not in terms of what influences the financial deepening.  
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From the three variables, again remittances have the highest positive 
impact and human capital the highest negative impact.  
 Nor does it matter if the countries are net-exporters of hydrocarbon 
products. The models (5) and (6) are similar to (1) and (2) in terms of statistical 
significance of the variables. Here too remittances remain to have positively 
influenced the most the financial deepening in the sample and the human capital 
negatively.   
To conclude, in all models remittances proved to be important in 
determining the financial deepening in the former soviet region. This variable 
remains significant even when we control for Russia, a major source for 
remittances to the other countries in the sample. The relationship between the 
remittances and the quantity of money in an economy remains noteworthy in both 
hydrocarbon exporting and non-exporting economies. The human capital is 
negatively related to the financial deepening in sample in all models; however, this 
might be caused by the limited data. Institutions do not influence the quantity of 
money in the economies of the former soviet union countries. 
  
VIII. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Financial deepening is essential for the economic growth in a country. This 
paper is an attempt to explain the influence of remittances, institutions and human 
capital on the financial development. The model uses a panel data on 15 former 
soviet union countries and Mongolia for a period of nineteen years (1992-2010).  
The main results show that remittances do influence positively financial 
deepening in this set of data when using random effects models, while human 
capital has a negative impact when using fixed effects. It is suspected, however, 
that this last conclusion is rather arguable because the extremes of the sample are 
too large. It was also found that institutions do not have any impact on the 
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financial deepening. Also Russia does not behave differently than other countries 
in this model, nor do countries which posse natural endowments, such as 
hydrocarbon. In all cases remittances remain to be the most influential variable.  
    Thus, it can be inferred that remittances do improve living conditions, 
but also increase private savings. This conclusion is in line with the findings of 
Billmeier and Massa (2007). Governments should continue to facilitate this sort of 
transfers, but also put additional efforts into encouraging individuals to invest 
these resources in long-term sustainable projects. Also, the banking sector has to 
become more competitive in providing services to migrants. This would reduce the 
high tariffs that migrants have to pay to the money transfer operators (MTOs) and 
would reduce the high risk by using other informal transfers. Transferring through 
banks would further provide incentives to save and invest in the long-term.     
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Appendix A: List of Countries 
 
 
1. Armenia 
2. Azerbaijan 
3. Belarus 
4. Estonia 
5. Georgia 
6. Kazakhstan 
7. Kyrgyz Republic 
8. Latvia 
9. Lithuania 
10. Moldova 
11. Mongolia 
12. Russia 
13. Tajikistan 
14. Turkmenistan 
15. Ukraine 
16. Uzbekistan 
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Appendix B: Data Source 
 
 
CPI    International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
GDP    International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Human Capital United Nations Development Programme, Human 
Development Index 
Hydrocarbon  U.S. Energy Information Administration: Country 
net exporters   Energy Profile 
 
Institutions The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage 
Foundation‘s Index 
 
M2    International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Remittances   International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
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Appendix C: Data Set 
 
Country Year M2/GDP Remittances HC Institutions 
Armenia 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,797463431 n.a. 
Armenia 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,797463431 n.a. 
Armenia 1994 n.a. n.a. 0,797463431 n.a. 
Armenia 1995 0,019724012 0,004847433 0,797463431 n.a. 
Armenia 1996 0,708280837 0,042223121 0,840654185 42,20 
Armenia 1997 0,145909556 0,00961616 0,840654185 46,70 
Armenia 1998 0,238621891 0,00673051 0,840654185 49,60 
Armenia 1999 9,188965019 0,058659223 0,840654185 56,40 
Armenia 2000 -9,219320522 0,056116019 0,840654185 63,00 
Armenia 2001 -15,10372685 0,047079071 0,849164192 66,40 
Armenia 2002 9,707150064 0,062126097 0,849164192 68,00 
Armenia 2003 8,805798703 0,072408119 0,849164192 67,30 
Armenia 2004 1,157454035 0,127169319 0,849164192 70,30 
Armenia 2005 7,524844172 0,111945838 0,849164192 69,80 
Armenia 2006 7,108680994 0,131083586 0,854471067 70,60 
Armenia 2007 1,972013238 0,125954614 0,859468872 68,60 
Armenia 2008 0,091267937 0,016207045 0,874970233 69,80 
Armenia 2009 0,553163254 n.a. 0,874970233 69,90 
Armenia 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,874970233 69,20 
Azerbaijan 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,336316667 n.a. 
Azerbaijan 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,336316667 n.a. 
Azerbaijan 1994 0,047802331 n.a. 0,336316667 n.a. 
Azerbaijan 1995 0,080611846 -0,001388782 0,336316667 n.a. 
Azerbaijan 1996 0,096535783 -0,003116474 0,351141667 30,00 
Azerbaijan 1997 1,082014025 -0,003391774 0,351141667 34,00 
Azerbaijan 1998 2,684174413 -0,003908611 0,351141667 43,10 
Azerbaijan 1999 1,503364231 -0,003513379 0,351141667 47,40 
Azerbaijan 2000 2,952740015 -0,006981211 0,351141667 49,80 
Azerbaijan 2001 2,509498474 -0,005878257 0,810332295 50,30 
Azerbaijan 2002 -0,156280391 -0,007960955 0,810332295 53,30 
Azerbaijan 2003 1,293512257 0,000229905 0,810332295 54,10 
Azerbaijan 2004 1,292943426 0,003403307 0,810332295 53,40 
Azerbaijan 2005 0,423557222 0,040345402 0,810332295 54,40 
Azerbaijan 2006 0,41266026 0,034148697 0,813173962 53,20 
Azerbaijan 2007 0,378267065 0,043680901 0,815748962 54,60 
Azerbaijan 2008 0,11339123 0,042607271 0,935607036 55,40 
Azerbaijan 2009 0,012660223 n.a. 0,935607036 58,00 
Azerbaijan 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,935607036 58,80 
Belarus 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,822719243 n.a. 
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Belarus 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,822719243 n.a. 
Belarus 1994 n.a. n.a. 0,822719243 n.a. 
Belarus 1995 n.a. 5,73178E-06 0,822719243 40,40 
Belarus 1996 0,000715007 6,12639E-05 0,835242343 38,70 
Belarus 1997 0,003703681 0,00010579 0,835242343 39,80 
Belarus 1998 0,022158765 0,000227256 0,835242343 38,00 
Belarus 1999 0,688376686 0,000650946 0,835242343 35,40 
Belarus 2000 -0,702649409 0,001563765 0,835242343 41,30 
Belarus 2001 -0,377144738 0,000212415 0,842057904 38,00 
Belarus 2002 0,119222304 0,000262103 0,842057904 39,00 
Belarus 2003 0,13603295 0,000741383 0,842057904 39,70 
Belarus 2004 0,033415234 0,000636914 0,842057904 43,10 
Belarus 2005 1,201352029 0,005299554 0,842057904 46,70 
Belarus 2006 1,187921146 0,007403455 0,844379806 47,50 
Belarus 2007 0,312609657 0,006763827 0,847307011 47,00 
Belarus 2008 0,150023569 0,007536128 0,853453953 45,30 
Belarus 2009 0,17167049 n.a. 0,853453953 45,00 
Belarus 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,853453953 48,70 
Estonia 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,825834108 n.a. 
Estonia 1993 n.a. -3,44795E-05 0,825834108 n.a. 
Estonia 1994 0,105981011 0,000408157 0,825834108 n.a. 
Estonia 1995 0,130957177 -0,000362464 0,825834108 48,05 
Estonia 1996 0,214518681 -8,53191E-05 0,855607864 48,74 
Estonia 1997 0,435649713 -0,000478482 0,855607864 49,44 
Estonia 1998 0,342629295 -8,53921E-05 0,855607864 50,14 
Estonia 1999 0,64595591 -0,000174847 0,855607864 50,84 
Estonia 2000 1,196191992 0,000178524 0,855607864 51,54 
Estonia 2001 0,876508355 0,001481584 0,877609473 52,24 
Estonia 2002 0,530365154 0,002137144 0,877609473 52,94 
Estonia 2003 0,648159352 0,003762548 0,877609473 53,64 
Estonia 2004 0,649344835 0,013709739 0,877609473 54,34 
Estonia 2005 0,685695064 0,019048541 0,877609473 55,04 
Estonia 2006 0,661551077 0,026215896 0,878809251 55,74 
Estonia 2007 0,286294939 0,022696916 0,881475918 56,44 
Estonia 2008 0,013931967 0,003094853 0,89538637 57,14 
Estonia 2009 n.a. 0,019927058 0,89538637 57,84 
Estonia 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,89538637 58,54 
Georgia 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,3814 n.a. 
Georgia 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,3814 n.a. 
Georgia 1994 n.a. n.a. 0,3814 n.a. 
Georgia 1995 n.a. n.a. 0,3814 n.a. 
Georgia 1996 n.a. n.a. 0,840709267 44,10 
Georgia 1997 0,822173077 0,03925817 0,840709267 46,50 
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Georgia 1998 0,705336023 0,054607869 0,840709267 47,90 
Georgia 1999 0,162069931 0,071337823 0,840709267 52,50 
Georgia 2000 1,760102289 0,052321015 0,840709267 54,30 
Georgia 2001 3,008269372 0,03550081 0,845389499 58,30 
Georgia 2002 1,230477019 0,043542034 0,845389499 56,70 
Georgia 2003 1,161875063 0,042992092 0,845389499 58,60 
Georgia 2004 1,497027854 0,054173397 0,845389499 58,90 
Georgia 2005 1,125882062 0,049004618 0,845389499 57,10 
Georgia 2006 0,71844335 0,059294248 0,842471089 64,50 
Georgia 2007 0,773582495 0,0674775 0,846367894 69,30 
Georgia 2008 0,422299608 0,053260213 0,962609867 69,20 
Georgia 2009 0,439436273 n.a. 0,962609867 69,80 
Georgia 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,962609867 70,40 
Kazakhstan 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,772592154 n.a. 
Kazakhstan 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,772592154 n.a. 
Kazakhstan 1994 n.a. n.a. 0,772592154 n.a. 
Kazakhstan 1995 0,008238846 -0,006926744 0,772592154 n.a. 
Kazakhstan 1996 0,098856531 -0,057504624 0,78311773 n.a. 
Kazakhstan 1997 0,095462758 -0,087966057 0,78311773 n.a. 
Kazakhstan 1998 -0,1515271 -0,080224907 0,78311773 41,70 
Kazakhstan 1999 1,224381593 -0,087162338 0,78311773 47,30 
Kazakhstan 2000 2,198265192 -0,102999638 0,78311773 50,40 
Kazakhstan 2001 0,868247557 -0,093055502 0,81319771 51,80 
Kazakhstan 2002 1,278827837 -0,109126224 0,81319771 52,40 
Kazakhstan 2003 1,710650733 -0,163618649 0,81319771 52,30 
Kazakhstan 2004 1,762866858 -0,247110374 0,81319771 49,70 
Kazakhstan 2005 1,237135421 -0,33664121 0,81319771 53,90 
Kazakhstan 2006 1,001277425 -0,453815528 0,815048294 60,20 
Kazakhstan 2007 0,812329132 -0,576917996 0,815031319 59,60 
Kazakhstan 2008 0,030704417 -0,046301676 0,82564111 61,10 
Kazakhstan 2009 0,367228033 n.a. 0,82564111 60,10 
Kazakhstan 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,82564111 61,00 
Kyrgyz Rep, 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,341783333 n.a. 
Kyrgyz Rep, 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,341783333 n.a. 
Kyrgyz Rep, 1994 n.a. -0,007028368 0,341783333 n.a. 
Kyrgyz Rep, 1995 n.a. -0,004495848 0,341783333 n.a. 
Kyrgyz Rep, 1996 n.a. -0,022608465 0,799321288 n.a. 
Kyrgyz Rep, 1997 0,839044838 -0,023593482 0,799321288 n.a. 
Kyrgyz Rep, 1998 0,223014554 -0,003670158 0,799321288 51,80 
Kyrgyz Rep, 1999 2,555678022 -0,06446662 0,799321288 54,80 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2000 1,729317641 -0,082183925 0,799321288 55,70 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2001 2,45016362 -0,094077963 0,810162347 53,70 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2002 18,40729144 -0,043455138 0,810162347 51,70 
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Kyrgyz Rep, 2003 24,75301179 0,041879438 0,810162347 56,80 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2004 15,86422871 0,177217976 0,810162347 58,00 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2005 8,134522034 0,321452769 0,810162347 56,60 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2006 0,912492941 0,053105323 0,812535307 61,00 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2007 8,190787978 0,647049821 0,814017342 60,20 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2008 n.a. 1,224202643 0,817375675 61,10 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2009 n.a. n.a. 0,817375675 61,80 
Kyrgyz Rep, 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,817375675 61,30 
Latvia 1992 n.a. -3,99827E-05 0,804617945 n.a. 
Latvia 1993 n.a. -6,53906E-05 0,804617945 n.a. 
Latvia 1994 n.a. -0,000312837 0,804617945 n.a. 
Latvia 1995 0,03936161 -0,000178553 0,804617945 n.a. 
Latvia 1996 0,018750893 0,00567841 0,843387264 55,00 
Latvia 1997 0,394032995 0,005897295 0,843387264 62,40 
Latvia 1998 0,398690873 0,00571602 0,843387264 63,40 
Latvia 1999 0,325012199 0,005399921 0,843387264 64,20 
Latvia 2000 0,959565721 0,009196064 0,843387264 63,40 
Latvia 2001 1,113307245 0,012820125 0,87055939 66,40 
Latvia 2002 1,037772024 0,014795885 0,87055939 65,00 
Latvia 2003 0,870215816 0,016077002 0,87055939 66,00 
Latvia 2004 0,502294113 0,018424058 0,87055939 67,40 
Latvia 2005 0,40081916 0,028941546 0,87055939 66,30 
Latvia 2006 0,415095164 0,032324312 0,871693025 66,90 
Latvia 2007 0,21485373 0,029981052 0,874068025 67,90 
Latvia 2008 0,031712748 0,03198761 0,891430544 68,30 
Latvia 2009 n.a. 0,045291097 0,891430544 66,60 
Latvia 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,891430544 66,20 
Lithuania 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,821990244 n.a. 
Lithuania 1993 n.a. -5,94943E-06 0,821990244 n.a. 
Lithuania 1994 n.a. 1,6354E-05 0,821990244 n.a. 
Lithuania 1995 0,08738984 1,38469E-05 0,821990244 n.a. 
Lithuania 1996 0,03057706 -0,003164475 0,860881633 49,70 
Lithuania 1997 0,176786606 -0,005277353 0,860881633 57,30 
Lithuania 1998 0,297943975 -0,005327313 0,860881633 59,40 
Lithuania 1999 0,592893641 -0,003940583 0,860881633 61,50 
Lithuania 2000 1,178940559 0,001033474 0,860881633 61,90 
Lithuania 2001 1,329264935 0,004074317 0,875031328 65,50 
Lithuania 2002 2,638804839 0,005495634 0,875031328 66,10 
Lithuania 2003 1,379259153 0,004673273 0,875031328 69,70 
Lithuania 2004 0,113226743 0,013397598 0,875031328 72,40 
Lithuania 2005 0,698595288 0,02029521 0,875031328 70,50 
Lithuania 2006 0,353215896 0,021788935 0,873821932 71,80 
Lithuania 2007 0,15666886 0,027719033 0,873788598 71,50 
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Lithuania 2008 0,054000505 0,024589887 0,886738187 70,90 
Lithuania 2009 n.a. n.a. 0,886738187 70,00 
Lithuania 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,886738187 70,30 
Moldova 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,789249872 n.a. 
Moldova 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,789249872 n.a. 
Moldova 1994 n.a. n.a. 0,789249872 n.a. 
Moldova 1995 n.a. 0,000201201 0,789249872 33,00 
Moldova 1996 1,073361313 0,061831663 0,795705423 52,50 
Moldova 1997 1,326930239 0,070222626 0,795705423 48,90 
Moldova 1998 0,859786383 0,093171631 0,795705423 53,50 
Moldova 1999 0,002428055 0,023514125 0,795705423 56,10 
Moldova 2000 2,637545502 0,28853609 0,795705423 59,60 
Moldova 2001 5,30335117 0,391848002 0,80619073 54,90 
Moldova 2002 10,95238584 0,554518308 0,80619073 57,40 
Moldova 2003 9,468846828 0,838273649 0,80619073 60,00 
Moldova 2004 4,634384421 1,05046146 0,80619073 57,10 
Moldova 2005 4,637005256 1,333926087 0,80619073 57,40 
Moldova 2006 3,678552384 1,706824979 0,809216379 58,00 
Moldova 2007 3,539348358 1,973023794 0,810384013 58,70 
Moldova 2008 0,331612426 0,264942414 0,815667548 57,90 
Moldova 2009 -36,10241774 n.a. 0,815667548 54,90 
Moldova 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,815667548 53,70 
Mongolia 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,312091667 n.a. 
Mongolia 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,312091667 n.a. 
Mongolia 1994 n.a. n.a. 0,312091667 n.a. 
Mongolia 1995 n.a. n.a. 0,312091667 47,80 
Mongolia 1996 n.a. n.a. 0,758521591 47,40 
Mongolia 1997 n.a. n.a. 0,758521591 52,90 
Mongolia 1998 n.a. 0,000109073 0,758521591 57,30 
Mongolia 1999 n.a. 0,000242912 0,758521591 58,60 
Mongolia 2000 n.a. 0,000762434 0,758521591 58,50 
Mongolia 2001 n.a. 0,002364399 0,792167188 56,00 
Mongolia 2002 n.a. 0,002165677 0,792167188 56,70 
Mongolia 2003 13,58623375 0,036363541 0,792167188 57,70 
Mongolia 2004 2,776189848 0,073406839 0,792167188 56,50 
Mongolia 2005 0,117169995 0,006429725 0,792167188 59,70 
Mongolia 2006 1,865949808 0,041586667 0,796732357 62,40 
Mongolia 2007 0,230239168 n.a. 0,799719511 60,30 
Mongolia 2008 0,965909629 n.a. 0,921626472 63,60 
Mongolia 2009 0,819134271 n.a. 0,921626472 62,80 
Mongolia 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,921626472 60,00 
Russia 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,796692676 n.a. 
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Russia 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,796692676 n.a. 
Russia 1994 n.a. 7,95059E-05 0,796692676 n.a. 
Russia 1995 0,000126041 -0,000284113 0,796692676 51,10 
Russia 1996 0,000137292 -0,000292458 0,3336 51,60 
Russia 1997 0,00033045 -0,000317189 0,3336 48,60 
Russia 1998 0,000758482 -0,000286773 0,3336 52,80 
Russia 1999 0,001097993 -0,000128848 0,3336 54,50 
Russia 2000 0,001946453 0,00019821 0,3336 51,80 
Russia 2001 0,00249336 -0,000467483 0,80341198 49,80 
Russia 2002 0,002186102 -0,001074868 0,80341198 48,70 
Russia 2003 0,000310458 -0,000223196 0,80341198 50,80 
Russia 2004 0,002704568 -0,002458894 0,80341198 52,80 
Russia 2005 0,002515999 -0,003366838 0,80341198 51,30 
Russia 2006 0,002651534 -0,00611041 0,806660318 52,40 
Russia 2007 0,002978917 -0,008548026 0,809768651 52,20 
Russia 2008 0,001790288 -0,012115765 0,813037645 49,80 
Russia 2009 0,001019123 n.a. 0,813037645 50,80 
Russia 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,813037645 50,30 
Tajikistan 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,75162662 n.a. 
Tajikistan 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,75162662 n.a. 
Tajikistan 1994 n.a. n.a. 0,75162662 n.a. 
Tajikistan 1995 n.a. n.a. 0,75162662 n.a. 
Tajikistan 1996 n.a. n.a. 0,763733017 n.a. 
Tajikistan 1997 n.a. n.a. 0,763733017 n.a. 
Tajikistan 1998 n.a. n.a. 0,763733017 41,10 
Tajikistan 1999 n.a. n.a. 0,763733017 41,20 
Tajikistan 2000 n.a. n.a. 0,763733017 44,80 
Tajikistan 2001 n.a. n.a. 0,786364657 46,80 
Tajikistan 2002 n.a. 2,002212922 0,786364657 47,30 
Tajikistan 2003 n.a. 2,977980816 0,786364657 46,50 
Tajikistan 2004 n.a. 3,631014019 0,786364657 48,70 
Tajikistan 2005 n.a. 8,555517397 0,786364657 50,40 
Tajikistan 2006 n.a. 16,46212682 0,790145486 52,60 
Tajikistan 2007 n.a. 38,70909481 0,793503897 53,60 
Tajikistan 2008 n.a. 55,59289352 0,803973216 54,40 
Tajikistan 2009 n.a. n.a. 0,803973216 54,60 
Tajikistan 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,803973216 53,00 
Turkmenistan 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,317316667 n.a. 
Turkmenistan 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,317316667 n.a. 
Turkmenistan 1994 n.a. n.a. 0,317316667 n.a. 
Turkmenistan 1995 n.a. n.a. 0,317316667 n.a. 
Turkmenistan 1996 n.a. -1,428005901 0,3243 n.a. 
Turkmenistan 1997 n.a. -3,183906392 0,3243 n.a. 
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Turkmenistan 1998 n.a. n.a. 0,3243 35,00 
Turkmenistan 1999 n.a. n.a. 0,3243 36,10 
Turkmenistan 2000 n.a. n.a. 0,3243 37,60 
Turkmenistan 2001 n.a. n.a. 0,3281 41,80 
Turkmenistan 2002 n.a. n.a. 0,3281 43,20 
Turkmenistan 2003 n.a. n.a. 0,3281 51,30 
Turkmenistan 2004 n.a. n.a. 0,3281 50,70 
Turkmenistan 2005 n.a. n.a. 0,3281 47,60 
Turkmenistan 2006 n.a. n.a. 0,782510917 43,80 
Turkmenistan 2007 n.a. n.a. 0,783515033 43,00 
Turkmenistan 2008 n.a. n.a. 0,900064625 43,40 
Turkmenistan 2009 n.a. n.a. 0,900064625 44,20 
Turkmenistan 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,900064625 42,50 
Ukraine 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,356983333 n.a. 
Ukraine 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,356983333 n.a. 
Ukraine 1994 0,000434752 n.a. 0,356983333 n.a. 
Ukraine 1995 0,00206188 n.a. 0,356983333 39,90 
Ukraine 1996 0,002242747 3,01477E-05 0,825465985 40,60 
Ukraine 1997 0,008112042 5,0597E-05 0,825465985 43,50 
Ukraine 1998 0,017956491 7,63853E-05 0,825465985 40,40 
Ukraine 1999 0,027942323 0,000215358 0,825465985 43,70 
Ukraine 2000 0,030070357 0,000410655 0,825465985 47,80 
Ukraine 2001 0,041744203 0,002195941 0,833880515 48,50 
Ukraine 2002 0,44698522 0,002952166 0,833880515 48,20 
Ukraine 2003 0,445703863 0,00418525 0,833880515 51,10 
Ukraine 2004 0,07718386 0,004838431 0,833880515 53,70 
Ukraine 2005 0,043700174 0,006489322 0,833880515 55,80 
Ukraine 2006 0,045397691 0,009254177 0,836763922 54,40 
Ukraine 2007 0,042193152 0,047930049 0,839787131 51,50 
Ukraine 2008 0,026376399 0,057554325 0,96048808 51,00 
Ukraine 2009 0,007468826 n.a. 0,96048808 48,80 
Ukraine 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,96048808 46,40 
Uzbekistan 1992 n.a. n.a. 0,344983333 n.a. 
Uzbekistan 1993 n.a. n.a. 0,344983333 n.a. 
Uzbekistan 1994 n.a. n.a. 0,344983333 n.a. 
Uzbekistan 1995 n.a. n.a. 0,344983333 n.a. 
Uzbekistan 1996 n.a. n.a. 0,792106941 n.a. 
Uzbekistan 1997 n.a. n.a. 0,792106941 n.a. 
Uzbekistan 1998 n.a. n.a. 0,792106941 31,50 
Uzbekistan 1999 n.a. n.a. 0,792106941 33,80 
Uzbekistan 2000 n.a. n.a. 0,792106941 38,10 
Uzbekistan 2001 n.a. n.a. 0,799846291 38,20 
Uzbekistan 2002 n.a. n.a. 0,799846291 38,50 
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Uzbekistan 2003 n.a. n.a. 0,799846291 38,30 
Uzbekistan 2004 n.a. n.a. 0,799846291 39,10 
Uzbekistan 2005 n.a. n.a. 0,799846291 45,80 
Uzbekistan 2006 n.a. n.a. 0,799181662 48,70 
Uzbekistan 2007 n.a. n.a. 0,799396136 51,50 
Uzbekistan 2008 n.a. n.a. 0,912999337 51,90 
Uzbekistan 2009 n.a. n.a. 0,912999337 50,50 
Uzbekistan 2010 n.a. n.a. 0,912999337 47,50 
 
